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  THE REALITY OF MORAL IMPERATIVES IN LIBERAL RELIGION   
 
HOWARD LESNICK 
Fordham Professor of Law 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
 This paper uses a classic one-liner attributed to Dostoyoevski’s 
Ivan Karamozov, "Without God everything is permitted," to explore 
some differences between what I term traditional and liberal 
religion. The expansive connotations and implications of Ivan’s words 
are grounded in the historic association of wrongfulness and 
punishment, and in a reaction against the late modern challenge to 
the inexorability of that association, whether in liberal religion 
or in secular moral thought. The paper argues that, with its full 
import understood, Ivan’s claim begs critical questions of the 
meaning and source of compulsion and choice, and of knowledge and 
belief regarding the specific content of religiously grounded moral 
norms. Liberal religion views knowledge of the "Will of God" in ways 
that pervasively tend to emphasize the place of human discernment of 
that Will, finding clarity in ambiguity and complexity, in a focus 
on process as well as outcome, in an openness to questioning as well 
as honoring tradition, and in a willingness to go beyond the 
propositional aspects of a text in seeking its "meaning." In all these 
ways, it may seem to dilute, even to dissolve, the imperative quality 
of moral norms. One’s attraction to or wariness of a liberal approach 
is to a significant extent grounded in non-theological preferences, 
and reflexive condemnation of liberal religion because of these 
differences fails to engage with the question whether they are better 
calculated to serve the task of achieving moral knowledge. 
 
 While it would therefore aid the process of coming to grips with 
that question for traditional religion to resist the tendency to 
dismissal, caricature and polarization, adherents to liberal 
religion need to take on a greater responsibility for articulating 
their own theological position more fully. I undertake briefly to take 
my own advice. 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
  THE REALITY OF MORAL IMPERATIVES IN LIBERAL RELIGION   
 
HOWARD LESNICK* 
 
 
God has made man with the instinctive love of justice in him, 
which gradually gets developed in the world.... I do not pretend 
to understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye 
reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the curve and 
complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it 
by conscience. And from what I see I am sure it bends towards 
justice.              Theodore Parker (1853)1 
 
A strange mystery it is that nature, omnipotent but blind, in 
the revolutions of her ... hurryings through the abysses of 
space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her 
power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, 
with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking 
mother. [G]radually, as morality grows bolder, the claim of the 
ideal world begins to be felt, [giving rise to the claim] that, 
in some hidden manner, the world of fact is really harmonious 
with the world of ideals. Thus man created God, all-powerful and 
all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be. 
        Bertrand Russell (1903)2 
  
“Ah! Thou hast ceased to call upon God,  
   Wherefore repentest thou of calling upon Him?” 
“The answer ‘Here am I’ came not.” 
“Did I not engage thee to call upon me? 
   That calling ‘Allah’ of thine was my ‘Here am I.’ 
   And that pain and longing of thine my messenger.” 
        Rumi (13th Century)3     
                                                 
*Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of 
Pennsylvania.  
1II The Collected Works of Theodore Parker, ed, Francis Power Cobbe 
48 (1879). Parker was a Unitarian Minister and leading abolitionist 
in pre-Civil War Massachusetts.  
2“A Free Man’s Worship,” in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays. 
Russell was a preeminent mathematician and philosopher in 20th Century 
England, and a peace activist during the Cold War. 
3The Spiritual Couplets of Mawlana Jalalu-‘D-Din Muhammad Rumi, Book 
III, Story I (2008). Rumi was a Persian poet, mystic, and Islamic 
jurist.  
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     I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Without God, everything is permitted.”  
 
 This classic one-liner, a judgment famously attributed (in the 
novel) to Dostoevski’s Ivan Karamazov,4 is readily endorsed by many 
people, in his day and ours. Many more lines are needed, however, to 
spell out the layers of meaning embedded in what I will call “Ivan’s 
claim.” Rather than move directly to analysis and critique, I will 
indulge a lawyer’s habit and begin with two highly specific stories, 
which I believe will illuminate our understanding of the scope and 
bases of the claim and the questions raised by it. 
 
 The first is well-known in the American legal world, for it ended 
in a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.5 
In 1963 Daniel Seeger, a recent college graduate, was convicted of 
unlawfully refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces. The 
federal statute recognizing conscientious objection to participation 
in war required that it arise from the objector’s “belief in relation 
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, 
sociological or philosophical views or a purely personal moral 
code.“6  
 
 In applying for exemption, Seeger asserted: “The existence of 
God cannot be proven or disproven, and the essence of His nature cannot 
be determined. I prefer to admit this, ... and leave the question open 
rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’” He went on to say, however, that 
“skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God ... does not 
necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever.” Professing 
                                                 
4Fyodor Dostoevski, The Brothers Karamazov 817 (Amber R. MacAndrews, 
trans. 1984) (attribution by Smerdyakov to Ivan in conversation with 
him). 
5U.S. v. Seeger. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The facts of the case are taken 
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). 
6As quoted by the Court of Appeals. The words are the statutory 
definition of “religious training and belief,” which is the requisite 
source of a qualifying conscientious objection. 
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“respect for belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their 
own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed,” he 
maintained, “I cannot participate in actions which betray the cause 
of freedom and humanity.” 
 
 The Court of Appeals, noting that Seeger’s sincerity was 
unquestioned, found him eligible for exemption, specifically 
rejecting the conclusiveness of the source of the constraint on his 
action: 
 
[T]oday, a pervading commitment to a moral ideal is for many 
the equivalent of what was historically considered the 
response to divine commands. [T]he stern and moral voice 
of conscience occupies that hallowed place in the hearts 
and minds of men which was traditionally reserved for the 
commandments of God. 
 
 Agreeing, the Supreme Court described the critical question in 
these words: “Does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the 
life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life 
of one clearly qualified for exemption?” Both courts thus viewed the 
critical question as the authentic existence of a state of mind in 
which a certain action is not “permitted,” with or without God as its 
source.  
  
 The second story is not at all well-known, although there was 
a moment during the Second World War when its protagonist rose above 
anonymity. Martin Niemoller was a German Lutheran Pastor, imprisoned 
by the Third Reich for anti-Nazi activities. In 1961, now a Bishop, 
he spoke on the University of Pennsylvania campus, and I went to pay 
my respects as much as to hear him. It was a time of high “Cold War” 
consciousness, and the organization sponsoring Niemoller’s 
appearance billed his topic as “Theism Versus Atheism in the Conflict 
of Nations.” Waving a hand toward the blackboard notice of his talk, 
he said that to him the salient question was not, were you a theist 
or an atheist, but “were you a Christian”? 
 
 Obviously, he then had to say what made one a Christian. His 
response: “A Christian is a person who accepts Jesus as teacher and 
brother.” He had been a submarine commander in the German Navy during 
the First World War, and he spoke of how he had subsequently become 
a pacifist: 
 
I would watch through the periscope for the enemy vessel, 
and when the crosshairs were amidships of it, I would say, 
“fire.” The sailor standing by would press a button, and 
I would watch the torpedo's wake and the hoped-for 
explosion. One day, years later, I asked myself, if Jesus 
of Nazareth had been that sailor, when I ordered, “fire,” 
would he have pushed the button?"   
 4
 
 Might a contemporary Ivan claim that Daniel Seeger, unwilling 
to postulate any God at all whose moral norms were binding on him, 
and Martin Niemoller, a Bishop of the Lutheran Church but describing 
Jesus as teacher and brother rather than Risen Lord, were not 
obligated, but merely chose, to abjure participation in warfare? Was 
the compulsion engendered by Seeger’s reading and reflection while 
an undergraduate, simply an arguable philosophical preference? Was 
Niemoller’s retrospective experience of Christ in the sailor, and his 
understanding of Jesus’ message and his consequent response to it, 
simply an eloquent figure of speech? 
 
 These cases illustrate the challenge to Ivan’s claim arising 
from either a secular consciousness or a religious consciousness 
different from his. We need to examine what is being said by Ivan in 
using the words, permitted and God. We need also to uncover the 
inherent limitations in the significance of his claim. I will suggest 
that such an inquiry supports this set of responses: 
 
 First, liberal religion grounds moral judgments in a different 
way than does traditional religion, one which attracts some people 
and repels others, but which cannot be called a better or worse route 
to knowledge of God’s Will without engaging (or begging) the question 
how human beings discern that will. Liberal religion does have much 
in common with (some variants of) secular morality, but is on that 
account no less a variety of “religion.”  
 
 Second, traditional religion’s claim to be able to ground moral 
judgments beyond merely human argumentation is grievously 
exaggerated. Specifically, positing the existence of God is alone not 
sufficient to render unchallengeably binding any specific moral 
judgment whatever.  
 
 In using the terms, traditional and liberal religion, I will be 
generalizing across two wide spectrums of outlooks. Nonetheless, 
there is, I believe, some recognizable and important coherence in both 
the groupings and the separation between them. My descriptions of each 
will be not the classic attempt to articulate necessary and sufficient 
conditions, but rather what anthropologist Clifford Geertz has termed 
“inexact similarities, which are yet genuine similarities.... We are 
attempting to articulate a way of looking at the world, not to describe 
an unusual object.”7 
  
 By “traditional religion,” I mean to refer to faith traditions 
or individuals whose understanding of the concept of divine 
inspiration includes some version of two sets of beliefs: (1) the 
                                                 
7Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia 97 
(1968). 
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Revelation at Sinai and (in Christianity) the apostolic witness to 
the birth, ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus, grounding the 
epistemic sufficiency of the relevant Scripture to give us knowledge 
of God and God’s Will; and (2) the divinely validated  authority 
within a specific tradition of an official body or person to answer 
(at least some) questions of Scriptural exegesis, faith, practice and 
morality.8 Although much recent scholarship has demonstrated that 
what in the last three or four centuries has become widely viewed as 
the “old time” religion is in fact not of antique lineage,9 it seems 
clearer for present purposes not to dispute its claim to the title.  
 
 Adherents to “liberal religion” do not avow those principles, 
although they typically accord the Scriptures some special 
sanctity.10 They may share with the traditionalists a belief in a 
concept of God as in some sense a “Person,” who can and does intervene 
intentionally in human history, or may instead think of God more as 
a “Force,” which acts upon or through humans as they seek to know and 
follow God. In either case, however, they believe that, in Roman 
Catholic Cardinal Francis George’s apt description: Liberal religion 
“treats God as an ideal, a goal expressing all that is best in human 
                                                 
8Although I believe that there are somewhat parallel beliefs in Islam 
as to the first “set,” and have the sense that there is also a 
(significantly more complex) version of the second, my knowledge of 
the Islamic tradition is so fragmentary that I shall not attempt to 
speak of it here. I am even less informed about Asian and African 
religions. 
9Perhaps the most influential scholar has been Karen Armstrong; see 
A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam (1994); The Bible: A Biography (2008); The Case for God (2009). 
 
10There are of course many well-known articulations of religious 
belief and experience that exemplify departures (in varying ways) 
from those now termed traditional, some but certainly not all of which 
may justly be deemed “liberal.” Perhaps the most profound, in my 
judgment, is Reinhold Niebuhr’s essay (published more than 50 years 
ago), “As Deceivers, Yet True,” in Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the 
Christian Interpretation of History 2 (1955). See also Henry Wilder 
Foote, The Religion of an Inquiring Mind (1955); Stanley Hauerwas et 
al, eds, Theology Without Foundations: Religious Practice and the 
Future of Theological Truth (1994); Gordon D. Kaufman, God the Problem 
(1972); Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology 
(1993); William Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence 181-200 
(Ch. 11, "The Image of the Invisible God”) (1996); Paul Tillich, 
Dynamics of Faith (2001). 
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experience, while the real agents of change in the world are human 
persons.”11  
 
 Traditional and liberal religion share the belief that noted 
sociologist of religion Peter Berger felicitously describes as the 
“fundamental assumption” of all religious faith: “[T]he reality that 
lies beyond ordinary experience means well by us.”12 Expressing a 
similar thought in a different way, Clifford Geertz identifies the 
“heart” of a religious perspective on the world as “the conviction 
that the values one holds are grounded in the inherent structure of 
reality, that between the way one ought to live and the way things 
really are there is an unbreakable inner connection.”13   
 
 The ubiquity of evil in the world complicates the eschatological 
vision of different traditions. At least some traditional religion 
has a palpable dark side, so far as human beings are concerned, while 
liberal religion tends to be grounded in a sunnier notion of the 
perfectibility of human life. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr, often gave 
voice to one version of the latter outlook in his powerful claim: “The 
moral arc of the universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”14 
 
 By a secular consciousness, I mean one that would avow the 
non-existence of that which transcends the natural order. Some (but 
not all) secular thinking includes a belief (however firmly or 
haltingly held) that moral norms or moral progress are in some sense 
inherent in the life of humanity on Earth, but grounds that belief 
                                                 
11How Liberalism Fails the Church: The Cardinal Explains, Commonweal 
24,25 (Nov. 19, 1999). Some adherents to liberal religion would 
disavow such an attribution as essentially secular. I address the 
“foggy” nature of this frontier below, pp. XX-XX. 
12Questions of Faith: A Skeptical Reaffirmation of Christianity 
2(2004). 
13Op. cit, supra, at 97. Conservative Rabbi Neil Gillman describes 
the belief that “God cares deeply about the world, about human 
society, and about human history“ as one of the “basic assumptions 
of Jewish eschatology.” “Eschatology,” in David L. Lieber, sr ed, Etz 
Hayim [Tree of Life]: Torah and Commentary, at 1435 (2001).  
14He was paraphrasing a passage from a sermon given in 1853 by the 
Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, quoted in an epigraph to this 
article. 
 For a sophisticated, comprehensive, and careful development and 
justification of a conception of “God” in which developing (although 
not inevitably emerging) “moral progress” is itself a property of God, 
see Richard Wright, The Evolution of God (2010), especially the 
Afterword, “By the Way, What Is God?”, pp. 444-59.   
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in wholly natural phenomena. Its adherents may nonetheless carry on 
their search for sound moral decision-making in their participation 
in the life of a religious community, while not sharing in all of the 
creedal professions of that community or most of its members. 
 
 I think it is fair to say that the idea that moral choices 
grounded in secular philosophies, being derived “without God,” 
reflect only preferences, is meant with popular culture primarily in 
mind.15 In any event, it is obvious that serious secular thought seeks 
to generate moral norms that are genuinely obligatory. Critics of 
secular morality may assert that the search is definitionally in vain, 
for want of a basis in compulsion supporting a reasonably specific 
set of norms. I will develop  below my bases for thinking that such 
an assertion (which is often made against liberal religion as well) 
often rests on a reflexive and contested concept of compulsion and 
the attribution to God of norms inescapably articulated or 
apprehended, at least in part, by human beings.  
 
 The “frontier” between secular and religious ways of 
understanding the world appears to me to be a porous one, with those 
nearby on each side having much in common. Indeed, the perception of 
that commonality is a significant part of the vigor with which those 
situated far from the frontier (in either direction) will often assert 
that those near it appropriately belong well on the other side of the 
boundary. I believe that this response is understandable but is a 
product of attributions that are astigmatic and inappropriately 
dismissive.  
    
 
  II. “PERMITTED” (AND NOT), IN A WORLD OF CHOICE  
 
 What do Ivan’s words mean to say? In everyday thought, to call 
something not permitted, obligatory rather than optional, is to say 
that one who transgresses a valid norm will face some serious external 
sanction for his or her delict. Indeed, our contemporary secular world 
has gone far to reduce the notion of norms as moral principles, binding 
one’s conscience, to a series of incentives and disincentives, 
embracing thinking famously voiced by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
over a century ago:  
 
The primary rights and duties [of the law] are nothing but 
prophecies, [not] something existing apart from and 
independent of the consequences of its breach, to which 
certain sanctions are added afterward. [A] legal duty so 
called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or 
                                                 
15The belief that moral norms are losing their hold on society has 
been expressed by tradition-oriented people in this country since the 
early days of the Massachusetts Bay colony.  
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omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or 
that way by judgment of the court.16 
 
 Today, legal “prohibition” is often effectively distinguished 
from “regulation” in terms of the relative effect of their incentives 
to abjure the practice involved. In this consciousness, following a 
legal rule and paying the cost of violating it are  viewed as equally 
legitimate options. Beyond that, in a liberal democracy, a person’s 
willingness to “pay the penalty” of continuing a (theoretically) 
prohibited act tends to make the propriety of the act in question “no 
one else’s business.” In that way, although grounded in an initial 
separation of law from morality, the constriction of the law’s reach, 
whether by the limited scope of the law or the extent of 
under-enforcement of its terms, tends to cabin that of morality as 
well. The existence of a separation between law and morality thus may 
depend on the direction of any cause/effect interaction. 
 
 A religiously grounded idea of obligation fundamentally rejects 
such a starkly positivist stance, regarding the moral norm as anterior 
to any sanction, and independently significant. Nevertheless, it has 
in common with Holmes’ position  an axiomatic link between a 
disfavored act and a sanction. Over much of our history, the religious 
sanction was exclusion from the faith community, presumably with 
Divine punishment (or mercy) in a life beyond the grave. In the case 
of societal failures to follow God’s word, the Divine punishment was 
temporal, whether drought or floods, plague or military defeat.17 
 
 But the religious character of the norm did not mean that the 
sanction was religious only. The union of Church and State was 
ubiquitous until the last Century, in Dostoevski’s Russia, Colonial 
America, and elsewhere. Typically, the Divine punishment attending 
violations of religiously grounded moral norms was accompanied by 
punishment, in this life, at the hands of the civil authority. It was 
the Church that pronounced Joan of Arc a relapsed heretic, but the 
State that burned her. There stands today in Philadelphia Old St. 
Joseph’s Roman Catholic Church, founded by the Jesuits in 1733. The 
desire of the citizenry to shut the church down was thwarted only by 
successful invocation of the Charter of Liberties given the 
Commonwealth in 1701 by its Proprietor, Quaker William Penn.18 
                                                 
16The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897), republished 
a century later, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 991-92 (1997). 
17Of the many expressions of this latter thought, a foundational one 
is that described in Deut. 11:13-18 (preserved in Jewish liturgy as 
the V’yahafta). The meaning of these words is interpreted in liberal 
Judaism to reflect its understanding of the way that Divine norms 
influence human history. 
18The first Article of the Charter declared: 
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Pennsylvania at the time was the only place in the entire 
English-speaking world where it was lawful to celebrate the Roman Mass 
in public.  
 
 These linkages between norm and consequence have contributed 
powerfully to the experience of what it means for a norm to be binding, 
for an act not to be “permitted.” Today, the association of obligation 
with sanction, whether on Earth or Beyond, has become deeply 
contested. So esteemed a Christian as C.S. Lewis saw what he termed 
a "preoccupation" with reward and punishment as a "corruption" of 
religion. He spoke rather of commands that were "inexorable, but ... 
backed by no 'sanctions'": 
 
God was to be obeyed simply because He was God. Long since, 
... He had taught me how a thing can be revered not for what 
it can do to us but for what it is. If you should ask why 
we should obey God, in the last resort the answer is, "I 
am."19 
 
Nevertheless, the equation of obligation with sanction remains widely 
embraced, and one sharing Ivan’s stance will often tend to regard 
Lewis’ words as little more than a charming poetic trope, icing 
without cake. 
 
 In today’s secularized world, moreover, all religious 
obligations, even if compelling once undertaken, tend to be viewed 
as having been assumed voluntarily. The widespread (and widely 
deplored) growth and acceptance of the practice of “shopping” for a 
congenial faith community illustrates the normalization of this 
far-reaching change. My teacher and good friend, Rabbi Marcia Prager, 
recounts an experience of a visitor to an Orthodox religious school 
asking a group of students, “How many of you choose to be obligated 
to the Halakha [the extensive body of Jewish law mandatory in 
Orthodoxy]”? When (as he expected) every student raised his hand, he 
responded, “Remarkable! If I had asked a group in this school that 
question a hundred years ago, no one would have raised his hand.”20 
                                                                                                                                                             
[N]o Person or Persons ... who shall confess and acknowledge One 
almighty God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World; and 
profess him or themselves obliged to live quietly under the Civil 
Government, shall be in any Case molested or prejudiced, in his 
or their Person or Estate, because of his or their conscientious 
Persuasion or Practice.” 
A plaque on the street corner outside the church memorializes this 
event.    
19Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life 232-33 (1971). 
20The Path of Blessing: Experiencing the Energy and Abundance of the 
Divine 153 (1998).  
 10
They didn’t choose to be obligated; they were obligated” - ever since 
the eighth day after their birth, when their fathers had had them 
circumcised in the Covenant of Abraham. 
 
 Much of the contemporary insistence in many quarters on the 
“old-time religion” reflects a refusal to concede the inexorability 
of that fundamental change. Ivan’s claim is often invoked, not only 
against avowed secularists, but also those who earnestly profess a 
belief in God, but differ in their identification of the content of 
“God’s Will” and their means of access to it. This tendency to enhance 
significantly the specificity of the belief that is required to supply 
a genuine ground of morality was classically articulated (and 
satirized) by Henry Fielding through his Parson Thwackum, who 
confidently proclaimed:  
 
When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and 
not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant 
religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the 
Church of England.21           
 
 Satire apart, I believe that Ivan’s claim often reflects a 
conception of religious commitment that is not satisfied with any 
religious belief as an adequate grounding of moral judgments. At 
stake, I believe, is an enduring tension among differing paradigmatic 
conceptions of God and of the proper place of human understandings 
of Divine moral norms. Now and earlier the most widely held view, 
treated often as simply axiomatic or definitional - and  embedded, 
I believe, in Ivan’s five words - understands God as transcendent and 
sovereign, the "King of the King of Kings," who spoke the world into 
existence and constituted morality by "His Word."22  
 
 In this consciousness, “Divine commands” are characterized most 
strongly by their otherness and inexorability. The apparent paradox 
of these two coexistent qualities - one remote and opaque, the other 
compelling and clear - is resolved by the idea of Revelation. The 
unknowable God reveals “Himself” in Scripture and the teachings of 
the relevant tradition. The human response is obedire, to listen and 
submit.23 
                                                 
21The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling 115 (1749/2005). 
22“God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light.” Gen. 1:3. 
The ruler of Persia was referred as the King of Kings, or the Great 
King. See Edwin M. Yamauchi, Persia and the Bible 71 (Baker Book House, 
1990). 
23I do not intend my use of the word, submit, to carry any inherently 
pejorative implication. Hor do I presuppose a simplistic, or indeed 
any specific, interpretative stance. See, e.g., law professor Timothy 
D. Lytton, writing of the Orthodox Jewish tradition:  
 11
  
 A partial departure from this paradigm challenges the analogy 
to the willed, perhaps willful, act of a temporal sovereign. It 
understands the "command" of God as (in the words of law professor 
Richard Stith) "the eternal law, part of the very being of God, rather 
than something merely willed by Him for arbitrary or contingent 
reasons."24  On such a view, strongly reflected in the Jewish and 
Roman Catholic traditions, "ethical requirements bind the conscience 
because they are true."25  
   
 This formulation does preserve the idea of divine law as supreme, 
in that sense ruling over humanity. Yet note the critical role of what 
I will call moral discernment as the basis for understanding moral 
norms. Writing of Catholic teaching, Canadian philosopher Joseph 
Boyle observes: 
 
[M]oral norms are not ... arbitrary impositions by God. 
They are ... the demands of our own rational natures. 
[M]orality is [the effort] by rational creatures [to] guide 
their lives to what is genuinely good. Thus, the reason 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Rabbis believed that the Bible is, on the one hand, a divinely 
inspired text and, on the other hand, a fundamentally cryptic 
document.... Indeed, [this] combination ... makes the need for 
creative and multiple interpretations all the more urgent.   
“Shall Not the Judge of the Earth Deal Justly”?: Accountability, 
Compassion, and Judicial Authority in the Biblical Story of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, 18 J.L. & Relig. 31, 33, 55 (2002). 
 See also the view of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (as he then was) 
regarding the “clarity” of what he terms the “Creation Narrative”: 
One must distinguish between the form of portrayal and the 
content that is portrayed. The form would have been chosen 
from what was understandable at the time - from the images 
which surrounded the people who lived them .... [O]nly the 
reality that shines through these images would be what was 
intended and what was truly enduring.  
“God the Creator,” Homily 1, in In the Beginning . . .: A Catholic 
Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall 1, 4-5 (trans. 
Boniface Ramsey) (1995). 
24Images, Spirituality, and Law, 10 J.L. & Relig. 33, 43 (1993-1994). 
25Matthew Berke, “A Jewish Appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching,” 
in Kenneth L. Grasso et al, eds, Catholicism, Liberalism, and 
Communitarianism: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral 
Foundations of Democracy 239 (1995). 
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which provides the basis for moral norms is a person's own 
reason, not something alien or imposed.26 
 
 A consciousness that can speak of "the demands of our own 
rational natures" departs in significant ways from a command 
consciousness, which would have difficulty seeing a self-generated 
call as a demand. The difficulty reflects the view (often implicit 
or reflexive) that a term like "self-imposed obligation" is an 
oxymoron: If its source is recognized as within the self, it is not 
an obligation; if it is imposed on the self, it must perforce have 
an external source.27  
 
 The departure is limited, however, by the emphasis on reason as 
the basis of an internally generated source of moral discernment; the 
strictures of reason are a set of norms common to the species, only 
in that sense "a person's own." In both traditional Judaism and 
Catholicism - and perhaps in some contemporary Protestant 
denominations as well - there is little room for the individualist 
stance momentously proclaimed by Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms: 
“I can and will not retract, for it is neither safe nor wise to do 
anything against conscience. Here I stand. I can do no other.”28    
 
                                                 
26“Duties to others in Roman Catholic Thought,” in Courtney S. 
Campbell & B. Andrews Lustig, eds, Duties to Others, 73, 84 (1994). 
27 Jewish theologian Michael Wyschogrod has articulated a challenging 
assertion of the inherent secularity of the claim of a necessary 
place for human discernment in moral decision-making:   
 [C]ontemporary man insists on knowing why the good is good 
and evil, evil. And once such knowledge is obtained, ... the need 
for a commanding God disappears entirely. For if the commanding 
God forbids that which is anyhow inherently evil and commands 
that which is anyhow inherently good, then his forbidding and 
commanding adds nothing at all.... . This discovery, first made 
by Plato in the Euthyphro, substitutes an autonomous moral realm 
for a commanding God.  
Abraham’s Promise: Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations 55 (R. 
Kenneth Soulen, ed, 2004).  
28A classic articulation of this thought is by Robert Cover:   
The basic word of Judaism is obligation[,] bound up in the myth 
of Sinai... It was a myth that created legitimacy for a radically 
diffuse and coordinate system of authority. But while it created 
room for the diffusion of authority it did not have a place for 
individualism. 
Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & 
Relig. 65, 66, 69 (1987). 
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 But the seeds of a significant departure from a command 
consciousness of the relation between God and humanity with respect 
to the moral law are contained in two celebrated passages of the Hebrew 
Scriptures themselves. Though speaking explicitly of God's word in 
the language of command, Moses reassured the People of Israel in terms 
that went significantly beyond it: 
 
Surely, this commandment that I am commanding you today is 
not too hard, nor is it too far away. It is not in heaven, 
that you should say, "Who will go up to heaven for us, and 
get it for us so that we may hear it and observe it?" Neither 
is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who will cross 
to the other side of the sea for us, and get it for us so 
that we may hear it and observe it?" No, the word is very 
near to you; it is in your mouth and in your heart for you 
to observe.29 
 
                                                 
29Deuteronomy 30:11-14. 
 A prophecy of Jeremiah expresses the thought that "God's will" 
is part of our own being in even more far-reaching words: 
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But this is the covenant that I will make with the house 
of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my 
law within them, and I will write it on their hearts; and 
I will be their God, and they shall be my people. No longer 
need they teach one another, or say to each other, "Know 
the Lord," for they shall all know me.30 
 
 While these Scriptural words can be read as viewing the 
"internal" aspect of the search for the will of God as limited to the 
use of a person's (God-given) powers of reason, they also contain 
expressions of a consciousness in which “obedience" becomes an active, 
creative practice. In submitting to the will of God, we first search 
for the voice to which we will submit; discernment of it requires our 
fullest creative participation - a process that will often require 
but not be limited to analytic rationality, and to obey is not simply 
to yield our will to a superior force (even to reason). An example 
is law teacher Emily Hartigan’s articulation of a feminist 
spirituality that experiences the law of God as "a gentle draw, more 
than a compelling force, an invitation more than a command ... [an] 
‘ought’ that beckons more deeply than it threatens."31  
 
                                                 
30Jeremiah 31:33-34. 
31The Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, 26 Harv. Civ. 
Rts-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 89 (1991). 
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 An “invitation,” a “beckoning,” rather than a command, yes; but 
beckoning “more deeply”? – to what? To, I believe, a more active human 
role in completing the revelation of “God’s Will.” Rabbi Neil Gillman 
describes such an understanding of Revelation as one that “strives to 
balance the complementary contributions of God and the human community 
in shaping the content of revelation.”32 Human agency is not a mere 
permission to interpret, but is an integral aspect of revelation itself.  
 
 Articulating the normativity of such a position in varying versions 
of liberal religion presents a complex question. For reasons that I will 
address briefly below,33 it is difficult to make responsible 
attributions of specific variations in the stance of different 
individual or denominational adherents to liberal religion. I will 
therefore speak here only for myself. 
 
 I find it impossible to believe that there exists a transcendent 
“almighty, all-knowing, and perfectly good personal being [that] holds 
beliefs; has aims, plans, and intentions; and can act to accomplish these 
aims with a “‘will’.”34 Nor can I affirm the existence of any transcendent 
reality, even one shorn of those qualities. However, I stop short of 
being able to make an “affirmative denial” of it. I tend to believe that 
the truth of that matter is beyond the limit of what humans have the 
capacity to know, but even if I am wrong about that, it is at present 
undeniable that confirmation of the truth of our perceptions, and 
external verification of our experiences, lie beyond our present powers, 
whether of intellect or technology.  
 
 I do, though, believe that the Scriptures of all three Abrahamic 
religions are divinely inspired, in this sense: I understand Scripture 
                                                 
32Sacred Fragments: Recovering Theology for the Modern Jew 26 (1990). 
Gillman attributes the thought to the eminent 20th century Protestant 
theologian Paul Tillich. Cf. Christian theologian Peter Enns’ 
analogous but more cautious stance, writing out of the Evangelical 
tradition. Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem 
of the Old Testament (2008). 
33P. XXX, infra. 
34Analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga - and in this he has millions 
of co-believers - so describes the God that he terms “real.“ 
”Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in William P. Alston 
and Thomas D. Senor, eds, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality 
of Faith 191, 192 (1995).  
 In disavowing such a belief, I recognize that many theologians have 
a less reductionist understanding of God’s interventions in human 
history. For a treatment that I find especially helpful, see Thomas 
F. Tracy, Enacting history: Ogden and Kaufman on God’s Mighty Acts, 
64 J. Relig. 20 (1984).  
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as the recorded responses of its human authors to their experience of 
a transcendent reality.35 They are divinely inspired in the sense that 
they reflect the efforts of their authors to reach beyond themselves 
to put into words (precepts, narratives, images) their  experience of 
moments of transcendence, of a flickering vision of the “rightness” and 
possibility of a world of peace, justice and abundance. God (the divine) 
to me is that “presence” toward which they reach, and toward which you 
and I reach as we seek to understand their words and our presence in 
the world.36 We (humans) are hard-wired - “created,” if you will - to 
reach in that way, and in our reaching we manifest the reality of that 
presence.  
 
 The 13th Century Islamic mystic, Rumi, in the poem quoted in the 
epigraph to this article, has given uniquely eloquent voice to such an 
understanding of God in his account of “The Man whose calling ‘O Allah’ 
                                                 
35Compare the compact statement of the views of two of the 20th 
Century’s most esteemed religious figures, Martin Buber and Paul 
Tillich.  
 Buber: “As a report about revelation, the Bible is itself a 
midrash.” God in Search of Man 185 (1955). (Midrash is a narrative 
intended to illuminate the meaning of a biblical passage). 
 Tillich: “The Bible is a document both of the divine 
self-manifestation and of the way in which human beings have received 
it. [T]here is no pure revelation. Wherever the divine is manifest, 
it is manifest in ... a concrete, physical, and historical reality, 
as in the religious receptivity of the biblical writers.”  Biblical 
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality 4 (1955).  
36Roman Catholic theologian Elizabeth Johnson says of humans, “we 
experience ourselves as beings who constantly reach out beyond 
ourselves ....” Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the 
Theology of God 34 (2007). Jewish feminist scholar Judith Plaskow 
has described the experience in these words:  
[A]s we join with others, in a way that only human beings can, 
in shared engagement to a common vision,... we find ourselves 
in the presence of another presence that is the final source of 
our hopes and intentions, and undergirds and sustains them. [I]t 
is through the struggle with others to act responsibly in history 
that we ... come to know God in a profound and significant way. 
Standing Today at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist Perspective 157 
(1991).  
 Academic theologian Gordon Kaufman offers an extended analytic 
articulation that I find congruent with these expressions. The 
Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God 31-57 
(1996).        
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was equivalent to God’s answering him, ‘Here I am’.”37 Similar examples 
abound.38  
 
                                                 
37Rumi, note 3, supra. The entire poem is set forth in the Addendum, 
p. XX.  
38William James describes the “divine” as ”only such a primal reality 
as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, 
neither by a curse nor a jest.” Varieties of Religious Experience 
42 (1994). Martin Buber famously expressed a similar thought in these 
words: “We hear no words, yet we fell addressed.” I and Thou 57 (Walter 
Kaufman, trans, 1955/1987). Cf. Arthur Green, Radical Judaism; 
Rethinking God & Tradition 91-98 (2010); Richard Wright, op. cit. 
n. XX, supra.    
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 My view of Scripture is grounded chiefly in my persisting 
experience of its epistemic power, which is qualitatively different 
than that of (say) Macbeth, Silas Marner, or Anna Karenina - indeed, 
of Lincoln’s Second Inaugural. What seems unique about Scripture is 
the ancient and enduringly communal character of its “reaching.” Pastor 
Brian MacLaren, a popular (and unpopular) writer, grounds his claim 
of the “unique and unparalleled role of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures” 
in their abiding grounding and salience in specific communities, for 
whom they serve as a “community library” that “preserves, presents, 
and inspires an ongoing vigorous conversation with and about God, a 
living and vital civil argument into which we are all invited and though 
which God is revealed.”39 MacLaren’s metaphor suggests that the 
post-canonical teachers of the Abrahamic traditions, by the depth of 
their engagement with the witness of their Scripture, have accepted 
the invitation, and joined with the “founding” communities across the 
boundaries of the ages. Thus, although the canon may long ago have 
closed, Revelation continues.40 
 
   The availability of that vision, however, is deeply constrained, 
and its “record” frequently marred, by the fragility and transience 
of the human lives of its authors, as those lives were lived in a world 
characterized by the awesome physical power that nature and human 
social life have over them. Seeking to align their belief in the 
wonderfulness of the natural world with a recognition of the power and 
apparent caprice with which it routinely devastated human hopes, they 
inevitably saw the hand of an unseen Power, benign yet unpredictably 
vengeful, at work in their lives.41 The plain text of Scripture, like 
the understanding of its authors, is therefore unhappily far from 
inerrant.  
          
                                                 
39Op. cit., supra, at 27. 
40To similar effect are two expositors of the Jewish tradition:  
Whatever the most recent rabbi is destined to discover through 
proper exegesis of the tradition is as much a part of the way 
revealed to Moses as is a sentence of Scripture itself. It 
therefore is possible to participate even in the giving of the 
law by appropriate, logical inquiry into the law. 
Rabbi Jacob Neusner, The Way of Torah: An Introduction to Judaism 
3 (1974). 
 Rabbi Donna Kirshbaum asserts that the “preoccupation with the 
interpretation of received texts creates community across time.” 
Comment, in David A. Teutsch, A Guide to Jewish Practice 241 (2011).  
41“Pathetic and very terrible is the long history of cruelty and 
torture, of degradation and human sacrifice, endured in the hope of 
placating the jealous gods.” Bertrand Russell, op. cit., supra n. 
1. 
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 I hope it is clear that, although I deem immaterial the factual 
historicity of Scriptural accounts, I do not dismiss them as forgery, 
fiction, or simply the result of a political agenda by the powerful. 
The actual words of Scriptural narratives were first recounted orally 
and came to be redacted, from one generation to another over centuries, 
as our remote and nearer ancestors sought to make sense of the world 
as they experienced it.  
 
 It may be true that the religious consciousness that I have  
described here is in actuality essentially secular - not in any 
pejorative sense, but purely descriptively - since I cannot responsibly 
avow (although I do not disavow) the presence or the absence of any 
transcendent reality at all, and what I have said I 
experience may be wholly a projection “out there” of perceptions of 
my own devising. Neither I nor one who thinks so can know the truth 
of the matter. I have come to think it is not, but I do not claim that 
I have proven myself right in my belief or given anyone else a compelling 
reason to share it. I neither disclaim nor proclaim it.42 
 
 
 One who has a consciousness like that expressed by Ivan might well 
believe that one who does not will lack any basis for denying the 
“permissibility” of any act. Ivan’s fear is widely shared, and not to 
be sneered at. However, many who reject Ivan’s metaphysics honestly 
hold, and can respectably defend, a belief in the existence and 
discernment of moral truths that transcend personal or cultural 
boundaries. More fundamentally, they almost never deem everything 
“permitted,” albeit they are using the word in a sense that does not 
posit a wholly external source of constraint.  
 
 One may contend that, “without God,” all moral deliberation is 
a facade, rationalization justifying willfulness, but rationalization 
is an ever-present temptation, and belief in God hardly inoculates one 
against its hazards. What to a committed traditionalist is simply a 
series of soft euphemisms - masking a free-ranging legitimation of 
willfulness, rationalization or (at best) self-delusion - is to the 
objects of such derision a more responsible and more accurate 
articulation of the experience of one’s encounter with Truth. Although 
we cannot come to agreement on this question, we can, I believe, come 
to understand, not only why we each find the other’s avowals 
problematic, but also why the other might responsibly hold it. To insist 
that only an external source of discernment of the Will of God can be 
“real,” and deserves respect, not only begs the question, it 
                                                 
42For an illuminating discussion of the meaning of the assertion that 
“God is real,”, see Schubert Ogden, The Reality of God and Other 
Essays 37-39, 55-59 (1963). 
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constitutes an imposition on those who honestly and thoughtfully see 
it otherwise. This was the great insight of the Seeger judges.43   
 
 
    III. INHERENTLY MUNDANE WITNESSES TO TRANSCENDENT TRUTH 
 
 A second basis of objection to Ivan’s claim challenges not its 
overbreadth but its asserted significance. The late Yale law professor 
Arthur Leff famously articulated a thesis that, although reminiscent 
of Ivan’s claims, tends to undermine its salience. Writing about the 
search for a grounding of moral judgments, he famously asserted: 
             
[Any] normative propositions in the form "one ought to do 
X," ... once found, must [themselves] be immune from further 
criticism.... If the evaluation is to be beyond question, then 
the evaluator ... must be the unjudged judge, the unruled 
legislator, the premise maker who rests on no premises, the 
uncreated creator of values ....  No person, no combination 
of people, no document however hallowed by time, no process, 
no premise, nothing is equivalent to an actual God in this 
central function as the unexaminable examiner of good and 
evil.44 
 
 Whatever echo of Ivan seems heard in these thoughts, I believe that 
in fact Leff’s assertions prove less than they may be taken - rightly 
or wrongly - to suggest. Specifically, to say, “I know that [a certain 
act] is wrong because, and only because, God says so,” is necessarily 
saying more than that God is, and is the author of morality. It also makes 
a claim about what it is that God “says.” An act is permitted if a person 
or group erroneously asserts that God has said otherwise.  
 
 But identifying the moral judgments of God is always a human action 
and therefore remains subject to human challenge. Whether that challenge 
is to the existence of any such concept as “God,” or to the claim of 
knowledge of God’s Will in any instance, the ensuing disagreement will 
necessarily be internal to human history, and therefore not 
unchallengeable.  
 
                                                 
43They were plainly influenced by the constitutional infirmities of 
a statute protecting some but not all religious grounds of 
conscientious objection. Indeed, in a subsequent case, Justice 
Harlan recanted his willingness in Seeger to accept the surgery that 
the Court performed on the statutory language, but went on to conclude 
that the statute was unconstitutional. Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 
344 (1970). 
44Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 Duke L.J. 1229, 1230-32. 
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 To choose two foundational examples, however one comes to believe 
that: (1) in whatever form it was done, at Sinai God indeed “spoke all 
these words”45 (what we call the Ten Commandments); or (2) the Angel 
Gabriel indeed spoke as recounted by Luke to Mary of Nazareth at the 
Annunciation,46 those beliefs are claims to the truth of prior human 
testimony to that effect, whether of the Biblical witnesses themselves, 
historic or contemporary members of one’s faith community, or (indeed) 
one’s own parents.  
 
 Although the Hebrew Scriptures richly describe a God of attributes 
and intentions galore, they contain one fascinating passage that carries 
a very different message. Exodus teaches that Moses was told by God to 
go to Pharaoh “to bring my people, the Israelites, out of Egypt.” Moses 
asked God what he should say to the people if, when he tells them that 
“the God of your ancestors has sent me to you, they ask me, ‘What is his 
name’?”47 The meaning of God’s answer has been debated for centuries. 
In Hebrew (transliterated), it is Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh; there are few 
Scriptural passages more cryptic. One rendering in English is, “I Am That 
I Am.” Jerome Segal, a contemporary writer, gives it this 
interpretation: 
 
God’s mode of existence is fundamentally incommensurate with 
human existence. And thus no predicate affirmed of a human 
being can ever properly be asserted or denied of God. All one 
can say of God ... is that He Is. Being beyond language, he 
can, in truth, tell us nothing of himself except that his name 
is “I Am.”48   
                      
 The claim - whether voiced by Ivan Karamzov, Fyodor Dostoevsky, 
or Arthur Leff - that only a Reality we call “God” can indubitably ground 
moral judgments is therefore true only definitionally; it is what one 
means by saying “God.”49 But any specific understanding of God as the 
                                                 
45Exodus 20:1. 
46Luke 1:26-38. 
47Exodus 2:7-14. 
48Joseph’s Bones: Understanding the Struggle Between God and Mankind 
in the Bible 108 (2008)). “I shall be what I shall be” is a common 
alternative. Martin Buber, through his long-time translator, Maurice 
Friedman, beautifully (and profoundly) renders the phrase as “I shall 
be there.” Eclipse of God 62 (1988).  
49I believe that Arthur Leff plainly recognized as much, although there 
is no short quotation that accredits my understanding him so.  
 22
unchallengeable source of the moral order is wholly formal; no specific 
content can be attributed to it without costing it that quality.50  
  
 Of course, Scripture is the ground of the belief that God has 
revealed “Himself,” crossing the boundary of Transcendence. But even 
thoroughly traditional believers seldom claim to have had a direct 
personal revelation, instead basing their faith (including in some cases 
their belief in the divine authority of their community of faith) on a 
centuries-old tradition, and their own history. There is nothing 
disreputable about this source of faith, but it is as "merely human" as 
it is to believe the words of the Quaker maxim (originating, I believe, 
with St. Teresa of Avila), "God has no hands but our hands, no eyes but 
our eyes, no voice but our voice."51 One who is convinced of having had 
a direct personal revelation of divinity is as "merely human" as the rest 
of us. One may be acting responsibly in affirming or denying the 
epistemic reliability of a specific Witness, including oneself, but we 
are all at risk of error. 
 
 If “knowledge” denotes truth, its existence cannot be verified. 
Legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron, although writing about justice, makes 
a point that is more broadly apt: 
No matter how often or emphatically we deploy words like 
“objective,” a claim that what justice objectively requires never 
appears except as someone’s view .... Although there may be an 
objective truth about justice, it inevitably comes to us as one 
contestant view among others.52 
 
 I may know, but do I know (or only believe) that I know; if I do 
(know), do I know (or only believe) that I know that I know; et seq. But 
it can be believed with greater and greater justification. The assertion 
that one “knows” is a functional claim, deeming the extent of persisting 
uncertainty of no existential or decisional significance. Conceptually, 
it may be faulted as analogous to taking a last step to disregard or 
overpower (rather than respect or transcend) Zeno’s Paradox: If, having 
begun in Philadelphia, I successively travel one-half of the distance 
                                                 
50Roman Catholic theologian Chester Gillis’s observation is aptly put: 
“We cannot hope to render the Transcendent transparent. Indeed, if 
we were able to do so, that which is described [would be] no longer 
transcendent.” Pluralism: A New Paradigm for Theology 179 (1993). 
51Compare the slightly different rendition attributed to St. Teresa 
by Andrew Harvey, The Essential Mystics: The Soul’s Journey into Truth 
206 (1996). 
52Jeremy Waldron, The Circumstances of Integrity, 3 Legal Theory 1,13 
(1997). Chester Gillis is to like effect: “[W]e do not know the 
Transcendent in itself., we only know our perception of the 
Transcendent.” Op. cit. supra, note XX, at 179-80. 
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to Ann Arbor 50 times, it is “true” that I have not yet crossed the city 
boundary, but I may nonetheless have compelling reason to act as if I 
have reached it, and no reason to act as if I have not. Indeed, in most 
circumstances to say that I am not yet there would simply be a bit of 
pedantry, even though neither inductively nor deductively can the gap 
remaining be bridged by further repetition.  
  
 The millions of people who would join Job in insisting, “I know 
that my Redeemer liveth,”53have taken that “last step” as their first, 
by reason of religious faith. Faith may ground certainty, as may love 
(and perhaps even hope), but reason cannot.54 Martha Nussbaum, writing 
of “Love’s Knowledge,” terms that condition “cataleptic”: The 
cataleptic impression is said to have the power, “just through its own 
felt quality, to drag us to assent, to convince us that things could 
not be otherwise.”55 One may then be speaking loosely of “certainty,” 
yet have warrant for the avowal. Nevertheless, certainty is necessarily 
a condition that describes the stance toward Reality of the 
person-believing (or -knowing). It cannot be a statement about the 
world external to the speaker, for no one has unmediated access to 
Reality or unmediated access to the basis of anyone else’s assertion 
of such access. Belief in a transcendent source cannot displace the 
Earth-bound character of an essential link in its coming into 
awareness.  
  
 This orienting insight is attested by esteemed religious 
teachers, ranging from the First Century Sage Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai 
- “There is no Truth unless first there is a Faith on which it rests”56 
- to the Twentieth Century Jewish existentialist philosopher, Martin 
Buber, whose understanding of Revelation is described by a contemporary 
Conservative rabbi in these words: 
                                                 
53Job 19:25. 
 
54 Arthur Leff again remains persuasive: 
 [A] fully considered moral position, the product of deep and 
thorough intellectual activity, one that fits together into a 
fairly consistent whole, [may] deserve more respect than 
shallow, expletive, internally inconsistent ethical decisions 
[but] labor and logic have no necessary connection to ethical 
truth.  
Arthur Leff, note XX supra, at 1238 (emphasis in original). 
55 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Love’s Knowledge,” in Love’s Knowledge: 
Essays in Philosophy and Literature 261, 265 (1990). 
56See, among many secondary sources, Milton Steinberg, As a Driven 
Leaf 13 (1996). Rabbi Yohanan led the re-fashioning of what came to 
be called Rabinic Judaism in the wake of the destruction of the Second 
Temple and the expulsion from Jerusalem. 
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[R]evelation at Sinai was not a matter of words; it was a 
revelation of God Himself. All of the words of the Torah are 
simply a record of how the people who in the revelation at 
Sinai (and many people thereafter) understood its nature and 
implications.57  
 To like effect - allowing for differences in modes of expression 
- are the writings of major 17th Century Protestant sources58 and 
contemporary secular thinkers.59 
 
 Yet, to the “certain” believer - whether the source of certainty 
is faith, love, reason or experience - it will not appear so, and for 
him or her to speak as if nothing has been said about “reality” is to 
                                                 
57Elliot Dorff, “Medieval and Modern Theories of Revelation,” in Etz 
Hayim [Tree of Life] Torah and Commentary, David L. Lieber, senior 
ed, 1401 (2001). 
58John Selden described the opposition of British Protestants to any 
exposition of Scripture that “went beyond the text [as], of 
necessity, a human invention, which a discreet Man may do well; but 
‘tis his Scripture, not the Holy Ghost[’s].” As quoted by H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 885, 889-90 (1985) (italics in original omitted). 
 One of the most famous teachings of George Fox, founder of the 
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) (1652), goes a significant 
way further. He challenged those whose “knowledge” of God was not 
based on direct personal experience but on the witness of others, 
even if grounded in Scripture and attributed to ones who Fox regarded 
as History’s highest witnesses to Truth): 
[T]he Scriptures were the prophets’ words, and Christ’s and the 
apostles’ words, and what, as they spoke, they enjoyed and 
possessed, and had it from the Lord; [W]hat had any to do with 
the Scriptures, but as they came to the Spirit that gave them 
forth? 
Margaret [Fell] Fox, “The Testimony of Margaret Fox,” in I The Works 
of George Fox 50 (1975) (italics in original omitted). 
59“There is no truth that truths itself,“ Robert Bellah, At Home and 
Not At Home: Religious Pluralism and Religious Truth, Christian 
Century, April 19, 1995, p. 425. 
  “Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief other than 
another belief.” Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge,” in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 137, 141 
(2001). 
 “To rely on [revelation] is to have faith in the prophets who 
communicate the revelation.” David Luban, A Theological Argument 
Against Theopolitics, 16 Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, 
Report 13 (1996). 
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belie that certainty. It cannot be inherently improper to refuse to 
do so.   
 
 At the same time, there is a boundary, the crossing of which is 
not justified by certainty of belief. I will use the term, triumphalism, 
to describe that which lies across that boundary. To me, the essence 
of triumphalism is the movement beyond holding a set of beliefs as 
“known,” as to be true and certain, to maintaining that such certainty 
suffices to delegitimate (rather than merely to dispute) any claim that 
the contrary belief of another may be true. What to the believer is 
obvious, to the skeptic is simple question-begging. What the one sees 
in the other as obduracy (or worse), the other sees in the one as 
triumphalism (or worse). The willingness to entertain the possibility 
that one’s fundamental avowals are in error is to one a fateful step 
on a dark and icy road to apostasy; the unwillingness to take that step 
is to the other a mark of subjection (nascent or full-blown) to “tyranny 
over the mind.”60  
     
 Analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga, defending the ethical 
permissibility of believing that his religion is true and that other 
beliefs, when contrary to it, are false, observes: 
 
  I must concede that there are a variety of ways in which I 
can be and have been intellectually arrogant and egotistic 
.... But am I really arrogant and egotistic just by virtue 
of believing what I know others don't believe, where I can't 
show them that I am right?61 
 
 The problem, however, is deeper than the presence or absence of 
such ethically dubious personality traits as arrogance or egotism. For 
many believers, the matter is not one of conscious will, for they do 
not regard their assent as a voluntary decision. Theologian Paul 
Griffiths has described the experience of such people this way: 
 
[T]here is a long (and usually complicated) story to be told 
about why I find myself involuntarily moved to assent to 
these claims at a particular time. Usually, the story will 
involve reference to habits, skills, and knowledge I've 
gained in the  past, but in all cases the upshot is the same: 
I find myself irresistibly moved to assent.... I cannot 
                                                 
60On the wall of the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C., is 
inscribed: “I have sworn eternal hostility to every form of tyranny 
over the mind of man.” 
61Alvin Plantinga, “Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” 
in Thomas D. Senor, ed, The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality 
of Faith 191, 200 (1995) (emphasis supplied). 
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deliberate and then decide whether to believe it or not. ... 
It is simply given to me.62 
 
 Non-religious people should therefore be cautious about 
dismissing as triumphalist or impositional the reluctance or 
unwillingness of (again) some religious believers to find legitimacy 
or (in some sense) validity in other religions, to acknowledge that 
others may have justification for holding their understanding of the 
Truth, or to engage in “dialogue” about matters of belief (or morality 
grounded in belief) with those who disagree. A set of beliefs may 
include or give rise to an obligation to be exceedingly wary of attempts 
to be persuaded to violate or seriously question one or more of the 
norms of their faith. For some (not all) such people, more is at stake 
than the outcome of a disagreement, more or less friendly, about a 
matter of metaphysics, ethics or public policy. In the friendly 
disputant’s expressions may be heard the voice of Satan. Of course, 
holding the belief that the beliefs of another person are the work of 
the Devil is a moral hazard, and might lead the believer into seriously 
wrongful speech or conduct.63  
 
 Wariness may therefore be an appropriate response, but a 
preemptive dismissal is not. All other things being equal, openness 
to dialogue across difference is a good, but it is not inherently a 
universal moral imperative, and all else is not always equal.64 The 
matter turns on the specifics of the individual actor’s motivation, 
intention and - especially - actions. Imposition is a serious wrong; 
a triumphalist attitude alone may best be thought of as simply a source 
of interpersonal incompatibility.   
  
 However, triumphalist attitudes tend to leach into actions. 
Indeed, the confident expression of an “attitude” is itself an action, 
in the practical sense that it can “pinch” those who do not share its 
wellsprings. This, I believe, is the core of the problem of the 
                                                 
62Problems of Religious Diversity 26 (2001). 
63 The one so believing will assert the defense of truth as a 
justification, which the other will regard as compounding the felony. 
That this leads to an indefinite regress is a problem, but that 
observation is not a solution to the problem. 
64For the classic statement of the traditional Jewish wariness toward 
“dialogue” with Christians, see Joseph B. Soloveitchik, 
Confrontation, 6 Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Thought 5 (1964). 
Rabbi Soloveitchik wrote just as momentous changes would begin to 
appear in the Christian world. See Eugene B. Borowitz, A Nearness 
in Difference: Jewish-Christian Dialogue since Vatican II, 
Commonweal, Jan. 13, 2006. 
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appropriateness of certain forms of “public prayer”: What to the devout 
may be simply a legitimate desire to express deep-seated feelings of 
gratitude or dependency toward “the One from whom all blessings flow,” 
when joined by a large percentage of the like-minded cannot help but 
constrain the freedom of those who differ.65    
 
 
 My words so far have had two objectives, to demonstrate that 
warrant is lacking for the dismissiveness with which Ivan’s claim has 
viewed the reality of moral norms not grounded in traditional religion, 
and to uncover the serious limitations of his unspoken corollary 
assertion, “With God, we can know what is not permitted.” I want now 
to look more directly at several important ways in which liberal 
religion nevertheless does tend to differ in its approach to moral 
imperatives, ways that I believe are connected to the pejorative cast 
of Ivan’s claim. Although I will suggest that the differences are real, 
and may justly lead one to prefer one view or the other, they should 
not be exaggerated through caricature, and do not warrant deeming the 
traditional view self-evidently superior. I will also seek to 
demonstrate that the bases of disagreement are only partially 
theological. 
 
 
IV. NON-THEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF DIVERGENT THEOLOGIES 
 
 It is important to recognize that practitioners of both 
traditional and liberal religion often understand their faith as an 
experience and not only as a set of factual avowals. One is more likely 
to emphasize the creedal aspect of a faith tradition when looking at 
it from outside, or speaking to one outside it. Rabbi Neil Gillman 
attributes to his teacher, Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan (the founder of 
Reconstructionist Judaism), the insight that “there are three possible 
ways of identifying with a religious community: by behaving, by 
believing, or by belonging”:66 that is, to say -- 
   (1) by regarding as normative a set of practices (whether of 
ethics or ritual),  
                                                 
65Cf. Marvin E. Frankel, Religion in Public Life - Reasons for Minimal 
Access, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 633, 639 (1992): “Why ... the 
proliferation of committees and public officials insisting that 
creches be placed ... on the public squares?,” and answers: “The 
reason ... is exactly to show others who’s boss. This is Christian 
country. If you don’t like it, as you presumably don’t, you know what 
you can do.”  
 
66Op. cit supra, n. XX at xvii. 
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   (2) by deeming as true a set of descriptions of some aspects 
of the existence and nature of transcendent reality and specific 
moments in human history, 
   (3) and by viewing as essential the living-out of a (more or 
less specific) set of norms - which may include certain practices or 
beliefs - as part of a community of (sufficiently) like-minded 
companions.  
  
 The multiple variations in the content and relative strength of 
each of these inputs, and in their interactions with one another, counsel 
caution in generalization.   
  (1) “Behavior” might focus primarily on observance of rituals or 
of ethical norms; 
  (2) “Believing,” although perhaps most often denoting acceptance 
of the truth of certain propositional statements,67 may rather have a 
“conative significance, an existential commitment of trust or 
loyalty.”68 As such it is often expressed as “belief-in” rather than 
“belief-that.” 
  (3) “Belonging” may be thought of as imposed by ancestry at birth, 
as freely chosen, or as achieved by being earned (and that through 
behavior or beliefs). Moreover, participation in a faith community may 
be regarded by a person as a requisite of being able to maintain behavior 
or belief, or simply as desirable.  
 
 As a result, belonging and behavior may each be both support for 
the other and supported by it, while each may also interact in like manner 
with belief.69 There remains, despite this complexity, some coherence 
                                                 
67Indeed, some rituals might be deemed, more or less centrally, to 
embody an understanding of “belief” as a set of propositional 
avowals. Recital of the Christian Creeds is perhaps the most 
prominent example. That they are not invariably so understood, 
however, is illustrated by Benedictine Sister Joan Chittister. In 
Search of Belief (1999) (see especially pp. 1-3).  
 
68Kurt Bendall & Frederick Ferre, Exploring the Logic of Faith: A 
Dialogue on the Relation of Modern Philosophy to Christian Faith 52 
(1962). 
 
69Clifford Geertz refers to “the collection of notions a people has 
of how reality is at base put together as their world view, [and] 
the way they do things and like to see things done [as] their ethos.” 
Religious rituals serve as symbols that “link these in such a way 
that they mutually confirm one another. [They] render the world view 
believable and the ethos justifiable, ... by invoking each in support 
of the other.” He goes on: 
The world view is believable because the ethos, which grows out 
of it, is felt to be authoritative; the ethos is justifiable 
because the world view, upon which it rests, is held to be true. 
Seen from outside the religious perspective, this sort of 
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of certain amalgams into recognizable affinities, of which the 
descriptive terms I am using, traditional and liberal religion, are 
important examples. Liberal religion tends to view “belonging” as 
available at a person’s initiative, and not a matter of birth, of merit, 
or (perhaps) of God’s grace. It tends to favor a less highly structured, 
more evolving approach to the ritual aspect of behavior and a less 
tightly specified approach to the delineation of the ethical imperative. 
It tends to welcome a metaphoric construal of religious avowals, making 
of them more a matter of insight or practice (behavior and belonging) 
than belief.  
 
 Metaphorical avowals provide liberal religion with a refuge from 
having to choose between giving up practices that have genuine 
significance and professing things it cannot believe. Its practitioners 
tend to regard “clarification” of their meaning as reductionist and 
distorting, a tendency that leads its adherents to turn to what I think 
of as an experience of resonance as sufficient warrant for shared beliefs 
and practices. The result is that liberal religion is not quick to 
clarify exactly what it is that it does avow, often being content to 
rest with rejecting meanings of those avowals that it cannot accept.70 
There is also in liberal religion a greater acceptance of the influence 
of culture on the demarcation of moral and wrongful actions, and an 
accompanying receptivity to complexity and tentativeness in moral 
judgments.  
 
 We need to recognize that the shelter of ambiguity and 
tentativeness inevitably enhances the tendency of both traditionalists 
and secularists to take liberal religion less seriously. At the same 
time, it remains true that the critical question is whether liberal 
religion’s wariness of “clarity” should be deemed dispositive - whether 
the greater danger is too strong a desire for clarity or too strong a 
caution against its vigorous pursuit. What follows in the remainder of 
this section is intended to accredit my belief that this question lies 
at the heart of the divergences between the traditions. Toward that end, 
I will examine four factors that coalesce to distinguish liberal and 
traditional religion. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
hanging a picture from a nail driven into its frame appears as 
a kind of sleight of hand. Seen from inside, it appears as a 
simple fact.  
Op. cit, supra at 97. 
 
70“Unfortunately, most liberal theologians have been better at naming 
and theorizing the problem than at articulating [a] constructive 
alternative ....” Wesley J. Wildman, The Ambiguous Heritage and 
Perpetual Promise of Liberal Theology, 32 Am. J. Theo. & Phil. 43, 
50 (2011) 
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 1. The first, and perhaps the most fundamental, factor is the choice 
between hiddenness and revelation as the most salient aspect of God’s 
nature and will. Cardinal Avery Dulles, a highly respected Jesuit 
theologian of the last century, dismissed as “widely prevalent” and 
“sophisticated relativism” the view that “religious truth consists in 
an ineffable encounter with the transcendent, [which] cannot be 
communicated by propositional language, since it utterly surpasses the 
reach of human concepts.” Terming such a view “mystical empiricism,” 
he claimed (quoting Pope John Paul II) that “divine revelation can be 
formulated, at least in part, in irrevocably and universally true 
creedal and dogmatic propositions.”71 My quarrel here is not with this 
claim, but with the use of casual side comments to suggest that all that 
is involved is a choice between popularity and integrity.  
 
 Indeed, the stance that Cardinal Dulles criticizes was given 
eloquent voice nearly 75 years ago by so celebrated an expositor of 
Christian faith as C.S. Lewis, who begins the poem, “Footnote to All 
Prayers,” with these lines: 
 
  He whom I bow to  
    only knows to whom I bow  
  when I attempt the ineffable Name, 
      murmuring Thou,  
      and embrace in heart  
    symbols which cannot be the thing Thou art.  
  Thus always, taken at their word, all prayers blaspheme ....72 
  
   The beauty of Lewis’s poetry should no more compel assent to his 
message than the dismissive tone of Dulles’ language suffices to rebut 
it. Traditional religion tends to respond negatively to an emphasis on 
the “hiddenness” of God, being more affected (as I suggested earlier) 
by a consciousness of the extent to which God is revealed in some amalgam 
of Scripture and the relevant Tradition.73 
 
 What is manifested here, I believe, are fundamentally different 
understandings of the accessability of Divinity to humans. Consider the 
stance toward revelation expressed by Evangelical pastor John 
MacArthur: 
 
All truth sets itself against error. Where Scripture speaks, 
it speaks with authority. It speaks definitively. It speaks 
decisively. It calls for absolute conviction .... Discernment 
                                                 
71The Challenge of the Catechism, First Things, Jan 1995, p. 46. 
72Footnote to All Prayers,” Poems 131 (1965/2007). I have reformatted 
Lewis’ lines (in the cause of greater clarity of meaning!). 
 
73Recall the wryly critical observation: “The only trouble with 
seekers is that they rarely find anything.” 
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demands that where Scripture speaks with clarity, a hard line 
must be drawn.74  
 
 Contrast MacArthur’s words with the cri de coeur of the noted 
sociologist of religion Peter Berger, introducing (in the words of his 
book’s subtitle) “A Skeptical Reaffirmation of Christianity”: “I 
confront God's silence, I am determined to bear that silence .... I 
refuse to deny either God's silence or my hunger for the silence to be 
broken.”75  
          
 If, in Lewis’ words, “taken at their word, all prayers blaspheme,” 
the work of discerning God’s will is inherently elusive, and strong 
reliance on the language of Scripture or the teaching of a tradition 
is a serious epistemic hazard. Indeed, contemporary scholar William 
Egginton quotes St. Isadore, the seventh-century Bishop of Seville, as 
using just the word Dulles rejects to describe the nature of God. “The 
mystical name of God is called ‘ineffable’ not because it cannot be 
spoken but because in no way can it be bounded by human sense and 
intellect.”76 Whether such a belief is a blindness to the clarity with 
which God’s will has been revealed to us, or is the source of a more 
promising search for it, is the question. Noting the difference opens 
that question but does not resolve it.  
 
 Moreover, differences in theological outlook tends to co-exist in 
a mutually reinforcing way with the difference between comfort with 
clarity and comfort with ambiguity. As a result, it is difficult to say 
which is the source, which the consequence. Beyond that, one’s choice 
in each arena typically presents itself as simply an experience of a 
fact (whether about oneself or the world) and not a mere “preference.” 
These factors will often make elusive any attempt at productive 
engagement with differing theological views.      
   
 2. This suggestion is reinforced by considering the different 
understandings we may have of the meaning of “meaning” itself. This is 
a complex question, going far beyond intra-religious disputation. 
Respected teacher of law, classics and poetry, James Boyd White, notes 
the tendency “naturally to accept the view that [meaning] is 
propositional in character," and suggests that “some texts are rather 
experiential and performative, [offering] an experience, not a message, 
                                                 
74Reckless Faith: When the Church Loses Its Will to Discern 50 (1998). 
 
75Questions of Faith: A Skeptical Reaffirmation of Christianity 10 
(2004) (emphases in the original). 
 
76In Defense of Religious Moderation 67 (2011). Quoting Dante 
Aligheri, Isidore concludes that God “can only be spoken of by 
metaphor or analogy, for we can know only his traces.” Ibid.   
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and an experience that will not merely add to one's stock of information 
but change one's way of seeing and being, of talking and acting.”77 
 
 Dominican priest Carlos Mesters illustrates this sort of 
realization, I believe, in telling us the “meaning” of the story of the 
Fall:78 “The biblical author,” he maintains, “was not thinking primarily 
of what had taken place in the distant past; he was thinking of what 
was going on around him, and perhaps even within himself .... He wants 
everyone to wake up to their personal responsibilities, to tackle the 
roots of evil in themselves.”79 Asked whether the story was “true,” one 
appreciating this understanding might say it was, without thereby 
attesting to its constituting the primal and enduringly significant 
event in human history. 
 
 Some confirmed traditionalists will immediately object to the 
suggestion that the “biblical author” was some anonymous post-Edenic  
human or the distillation of a long line of story-tellers’ art, rather 
than God Himself, acting through Moses. To me the salience of such an 
objection is manifest: It is unlikely that one who believes the 
historicity of the Genesis account would use the words that Fr. Mesters 
chose, which seem to “reduce” the account to a parable. Putting to one 
side, however, the question of the validity of an objection based on 
the theological question of authorship, a person’s stance on that 
question will often reflect a viewpoint that is not theological in 
origin: the proper response to the view that the words of a story 
ordinarily “mean” what the semantics and syntax of its words suggests, 
that they are self-evidently (in James White’s word) propositional. 
 
 I am here skating close to the edge of the utility of the categories 
- liberal and traditional - that I am using. Cardinal Dulles has 
described as grounded in Catholic theology the claim that, although 
“revelation is not in the first instance propositional[,] it is 
unacceptable to say that revelation does not contain any factual 
information.”80 Yet, by Cardinal Ratzinger’s approach to understanding 
the Creation story,81 Fr. Mesters’ use of the story of the Fall seems 
wholly unobjectionable. I believe the complexity is attributable to the 
difference between a tradition of how Scripture is to be read and one 
                                                 
77“What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?,” in From Expectations 
to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education 216-18 (2000). 
 
78Gen. 3. 
 
79God, Where Are You? Rediscovering the Bible 14 (2003). 
 
80The Orthodox Imperative, First Things 31, 33 (Aug/Sept 2006). 
 
81See n. XX, supra. 
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of who may establish a Tradition that is co-equal to Scripture in 
authoritativeness. The traditions of both Catholicism and traditional 
Judaism are hospitable to substantial interpretive creativity, but 
believe that, respectively, the Roman Magisterium or the Rabbinic 
lineage has Divine authority to “teach” in ways that constrain the 
interpretative license of members of their faith communities. 
 
 Rejection of a propositional understanding of the word, meaning,  
will incline one to be hospitable to an understanding of it as referring 
to a text’s significance, its import, which is often conveyed 
indirectly, even obscurely. From this consciousness, a deeper fidelity 
to the “Word of God” may be found through listening for it in ways that 
are not so tightly bound to explaining the words of God alone. In so 
doing, on this view we may better serve God by turning to and relying 
on our human power to search and discern.82  
 
 Plainly, doing so will lead to both a lessened emphasis on the 
question of historicity and a perception and acceptance of an enhanced 
potential for ambiguity and uncertainty in specifying just what the 
content of a specific witness is. While to some that is a grievous 
failing, a source of serious discomfort and an invitation to lassitude, 
to others these fears are to be taken seriously but are not dispositive, 
for surmounting them removes a major barrier to embracing a truer route 
to discernment of God’s will. The merits of such a stance cannot readily 
be judged by a preexisting preference for either view of what “means” 
means, nor by a theologically grounded acceptance or rejection of the 
propositional or historical truth of Scripture, for cause and 
consequence resist disentanglement. Yet each of those preferences will 
affect the other. 
 
 
 3. A third, intertwined, source of difference arises from the fact 
that, in approaching the task of discerning God’s Will, liberal religion 
is hospitable to avowed limits on the normative force of tradition. This 
question too goes beyond the religious sphere. Justice Holmes famously 
growled:  
 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is 
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.83 
 
                                                 
82For a penetrating, lucid development of this thought, with respect 
to the task of understanding the Parables of Jesus, see David 
Bartlett, The Shape of Scriptural Authority 65-78 (1983). 
  
83The Path of the Law, n. XX supra, at 469, and reprinted, id, at 1001. 
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 Of course, with respect to religion, the lawyerly qualifications 
implicit in the Justice’s second sentence simply swallow up the 
implications of the first: In traditional religion, except for changes 
that are themselves of transformational religious significance - the 
Coming of Christ in Christianity, the Destruction of the Second Temple 
and the expulsion from Jerusalem in Judaism - “grounds” endure, and 
“imitation” is fidelity, not blindness.  
 
 The bitterest intra-religious disputes are over the challenges to 
the sanctity of tradition that have characterized the 19th and 20th 
Centuries (and seem to have continued unabated in the 21st). Hungarian 
Rabbi Moshe Sofer (known as the Hatam Sofer) confidently proclaimed: 
“Innovation is forbidden by the Torah.”84 A century later, Rabbi Mordecai 
Kaplan expressed a starkly competing norm with like assurance: “The past 
has a vote not a veto.”85 A far more widely known difference has existed 
within the Roman Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council a 
half-century ago. There is a vast body of learning and disputation over 
the efforts of the Popes who have succeeded John XXIII to rein in the 
extent to which the Council should be understood as legitimating 
far-reaching changes in many aspects of Catholic faith and practice - 
including the question of the propriety of that very disputation.86  
 
 It is difficult for traditionalists to see the legitimation of 
reexamination, adaptation, and revision of norms and practices as 
anything other than an invitation to rampant subjectivity. What is at 
work, in my judgment, is (again) one’s comfort for felt certainty on 
the one hand, or for acknowledged ambiguity on the other, and theological 
avowals are often the consequence rather than the source of differences 
in one’s stance on this issue. 
 
 The enduring conflict over the degree of sanctity to be given the 
Bible is, in part, an aspect of this phenomenon. George Steiner, American  
literary critic, philosopher, essayist and novelist, writing an 
                                                 
84As quoted (among many other places)in Raphael Patai, The Jews of 
Hungary: History, Culture, Psychology 294 (1996). 
 
85See Rebecca Alpert & Jacob Staub, Exploring Judaism: A 
Reconstructionist Approach 29 (1985), which uses this line, 
attributed to Kaplan, as a chapter title. 
 
86Fr. Richard John Neuhaus eloquently articulated the principle that 
“the Catholic believes that ... the bishop of Rome is Peter among 
us, that the words of Jesus, ‘He who hears you, hears me‘, have abiding 
historical applicability until the end of time.” The Persistence of 
the Catholic Moment, 52 Cath. U.L. Rev. 269, 278 (2003). Of course, 
many who claim to be authentically Roman Catholic believe something 
less univocal about the primacy of the Pope.   
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“Introduction to the Hebrew Bible,” has ably expressed what I believe 
is the premise of the view often too quickly dismissed as fundamentalist: 
 
Prise loose a single brick, and the edifice will collapse. 
Compromise, discard a single affirmation as to creation in 
Genesis, as to sumptuary and dietary prescriptions in the 
Torah, as to Elijah's ascent into heaven, and you will, 
irreparably, bring the sanctuary of God's nearness to man 
tumbling down.87 
 
 This invocation of the “slippery slope” is not merely facile 
rhetoric; the slope is slippery indeed. It is no mean challenge to reject 
inerrancy or literalism yet avoid a polarized conception of the 
Scriptures as just another important book, some of it well worth taking 
to heart, “up there” with Plato, J.S. Mill, and whom-you-choose. 
Nonetheless, adherents of liberal religion, while rejecting any whiff 
of “fundamentalism,” tend to remain committed to the specialness of 
Scripture, but seem to regard it as a sufficient response to polar 
challenges from traditionalists and secularists to attempt to live out 
a “middle position” without articulating its coherence or specifying 
its boundaries.88 
 
 It is not surprising that liberal religion often rests content with 
a certain reticence about articulating just what it does avow, whether 
with specific respect to Scripture or more broadly. Having arisen out 
of a critical engagement with important aspects of  traditional 
Christianity or Judaism, it will naturally begin the process of forging 
a new tradition with emphasizing what in the other it rejects.89 Beyond 
that, it is wholly appropriate that it will go slowly in creating an 
“orthodoxy” of its own. Just as the proliferation of differing versions 
of early Christianity was part of the background to the heightened 
                                                 
87“A Preface to the Hebrew Bible,” in No Passion Spent: Essays 
1978-1995 85 (1996). 
 
88Brian McLaren’s suggestion, in A New Kind of Christianity, Ch, 8, 
that we think of the Scriptures as a “Community Library” rather than 
a “Legal Constitution,” is an imaginative and thought-productive 
counter-example, putting forth a conception of Scripture that 
meaningfully guides one’s approach to its epistemic value. I have 
briefly described above, p. XX, my own effort to articulate a 
stable-enough point of rest that slides only part-way down the 
slippery slope.  
  
89I do not mean thereby to ignore or dismiss the substantial body of 
scholarship seeking to demonstrate that an even older tradition in 
fact supports the approach of present-day liberal religion, 
especially with respect to the interpretation of Scripture. See, 
e.g., the work of Karen Armstrong, op. cit. supra note XXX. 
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emphasis on hierarchy and doctrinal purity of the early centuries of 
the Christian Era,90 so too, the converse: Liberal religion may resist 
specification - especially  communal specification - of beliefs because 
it may foretell the reintroduction of those qualities.  
 
 Whether these concerns justify, or only explain, this reticence 
in the 21st Century, it eases the way for one of a traditional  
consciousness to dismiss liberal religion as thinly disguised 
secularism. At the same time, those who are militantly secular in their 
outlook on the world will tend to see in the “non-combatant” stance of 
liberal religion little more than an attempt to paper over the grievous 
sins of religions past and present with a thin layer of rationality and 
a bland display of good will. In that way, each “pole” tends to consign 
liberal religion to a spot closer to the other. 
 
                                                 
90See Ch. 4 (“Boundaries Defined”) of Diarmaid MacCulloch, 
Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years 112-54 (2010). He notes:  
The advantage of creedal statements was that almost anyone was 
capable of learning them quickly to standardize belief and put 
up barriers about speculation or what was likely to be a 
boundless set of disagreements about what the Christian 
scriptures actually meant. (p. 129). 
There is a similar story to be told about the Orthodox Jewish response 
to the rise of Reform Judaism in 19th Century Central Europe.  
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 Such responses often appear in exaggerated and dismissive form, but 
the problem to which they respond is a genuine one, built in by the very 
nature of liberal religion.91 Even though it may not be possible to  
ameliorate significantly the criticisms of traditional religion and 
militant secularism, it is both possible and desirable for individuals 
(if not for liberal faith communities) who find themselves between those 
poles to essay articulations of their beliefs, if only as an 
acknowledgment, and hopefully a safeguard, of epistemic responsibility. 
  
 
 4. Finally, liberal religion is not strongly focused on the specific 
“permitted-or-prohibited” answer to many questions of morality. Leading 
Protestant theologian James Gustafson termed the traditional approach 
of Roman Catholic teaching a “juridical” model: “[An} action is right 
or wrong, depending on whether it conforms or is contrary to a rule, a 
law, and the outcome of moral argument.”92 It is widely applicable as 
well to much religious and secular moral thought. The approach he prefers 
is one that he terms developing a “responsible relationship” between a 
person considering a morally freighted course of action and his or her 
physician, family member, or moral counselor (whom Gustafson calls a 
“moralist”). In that interaction, each party assumes responsibility 
rather than having one decide whether to ascribe it to the other.  
 
 This approach is difficult to describe briefly. Here is a segment 
that may suggest its flavor: 
 
[The moralist] will recognize that his judgement, and that of 
others who have informed him, while learned, mature, and 
hopefully sound, remains the judgment of a finite being with 
all the limitations of his perspective. He will, in a situation 
like this, acknowledge the liberty of [the other’s] 
conscience, and will not immediately offer an authoritative 
answer to her questions. As a moralist he is to help her to 
objectify her situation, to see it from other perspectives 
than the one she comes with.... He is to help her to understand 
her past, not as a way of excusing anything in the present, 
but as a way of gaining some objectivity toward the present.93 
 
                                                 
91Rabbi Dana Evan Kaplan, writing of “The Theological Roots of Reform 
Judaism’s Woes,” makes a related warning: “In the absence of a strong 
theological basis for making religious demands, the members [of a 
religious community] lose interest and wander off.” 
<http://www.forward.com/articles/135476>, p.2 (3/1/2011). 
  
92“A Protestant Ethical Approach,” in John T. Noonan, Jr, ed, The 
Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives 103 {1970). 
93Id, at 109. 
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 While the result may seem optional, striking a complex elusive 
balance that could go either way, the process is not, and is more 
demanding in some ways than a simple yes-or-no, extending (in Gustafson’ 
words) beyond the “focal point of a particular act,” to the “well-being 
of the person involved “over a long range of time.”94  
 
 It would be an error to equate hospitability to such a response with 
mere subjectivism. Gustafson speaks of gaining “some objectivity,” which 
is a dual espousal: Objectivity is elusive yet not wholly unattainable. 
The belief that a moral judgment should be nuanced, qualified, or 
context-specific makes its truth more difficult to discern and 
articulate, and multiplies points of potential disagreement, but it 
doesn’t introduce a subjectivity that was not otherwise warranted.  
 
 A famous example involves Immanuel Kant’s claim that the obligation 
to tell the truth should govern one’s response to a question from a 
would-be murderer about the whereabouts of his or her intended victim.95 
One may say that Kant was right in asserting a broad deontological 
justification for the immorality of lying, and nonetheless dispute his 
application of it to that instance. Insistence on drawing the line at 
would-be murderers may be warranted or not, but it applies and 
complicates but does not eliminate an asserted distinction between right 
and wrong.   
 
 Yet, the existence of circumstances in which the factors that bear 
on a moral question are complex or subtle, and the evaluator’s 
necessarily limited access to knowledge of some of those factors, will 
make uncertainty in application wholly predictable and wholly 
appropriate. I believe that epistemic modesty in judging the moral 
universe of others is often morally appropriate, and that its absence 
is a morally hazardous trait, but one who wants to know whether an act 
“is permitted” will often find this approach laden with ambiguity, 
complexity, and the dangers of rationalization, and the possibility of 
meeting and grappling with those pitfalls not worth the candle. To 
others, the dangers need to be seen as real, and as dangers, but not as 
outweighing the dangers avoided. Again, it is such differences that will 
often be the source of one’s reaction to a process-oriented as against 
an outcome-oriented normativity. 
 
 
 To summarize, there is a significant parallelism in the several 
aspects of the real differences that I believe exist regarding the effect 
of choosing between what I have loosely termed a traditional and a liberal 
approach to religious questions. I have invited you to consider: 
                                                 
94Ibid. 
 
95On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, 
published with Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 63-66, trans, 
J.N. Ellington (1785/3d ed, 1993). 
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 - the hiddenness versus the revelation of God; 
 - the propositional versus the “significance” aspect of a reference 
to the “meaning” of a text; 
 - the value and feasibility of articulating with some specificity 
a stance toward Scripture and Tradition that rejects both orthodoxy and 
a wholly naturalist approach; and 
 - the preference between result and process in moral 
decision-making, between ascribing responsibility and assuming it. 
      
 Each arena implicates a similar choice between clarity and 
ambiguity as the more reliable path to moral discernment. The bases for 
one set of choices or the other are of singular importance, but making 
(or defending) either choice responsibly is not aided by simply rejecting 
the other as tantamount to relativist secularism or a manifestation or 
enabler of fundamentalism.   
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
  That God does not exist, I cannot deny. 
  That my whole being cries out for God, I cannot forget. 
          Jean-Paul Sartre96 
 
 Words like those of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai - “There is no Truth 
unless first there is a Faith on which it rests”97 - apply to all 
assertions regarding matters transcendent, whether they express 
vigorous faith or thorough-going skepticism. All are undergirded by a 
“leap,” for rational thinking can only proceed from a given of some kind. 
Each of us should therefore be slow to judge another’s ground for that 
leap, however much we might be living out a different one. 
    
 If “certain” believers (or militant skeptics) come to realize that 
their certainty, like the belief to which it relates, is “theirs,” not 
only in the sense that it may be an aspect of their identity, but that 
it cannot escape its boundary in the self and that its truth is not 
verifiable, they may be able to acknowledge that the justification that 
others may have for their conflicting beliefs need not draw their own 
belief in question.98 Although P and not-P cannot both be true, belief 
                                                 
96<Google Books.com> has several entries that attribute these lines 
to Sartre, but without citation of a source. 
 
97See p. XXX, supra. 
 
98The best brief treatment of this question that I am aware of is by 
Ronald F. Thiemann, “Beyond Exclusivism and Absolutism: A 
Trinitarian Theology of the Cross,” in Miroslav Volf & Michael 
Welker, eds, God’s Life in Trinity, Ch. 10 (2006). Fuller development 
of his approach appears in two earlier books, Revelation and 
 40
in the truth of each can be justified, and may justifiably ground 
action.99 A widening awareness that conflicting beliefs can justifiably, 
albeit uncomfortably, coexist can measurably ameliorate defensiveness 
and caricature.  
 
 At the same time, individuals or faith communities in the liberal 
tradition, and (again) militant skeptics, need to keep in mind the 
distinction between disbelieving a religious community’s (or 
individual’s) avowal of the certain truth of a belief or practice - which 
is a statement about the one making the avowal - and dismissing any such 
claim as fundamentalism, triumphalism, or superstition.100 In our 
polarized society, it is easy for any of us to experience our beliefs 
and practices as under attack by dominant “others,” while viewing their 
claim to a like underdog status as either paranoid or manipulative. As 
individuals, we all might believe that we know who is the dominant and 
who the besieged. We may all be wrong about that, but we cannot all be 
right. 
 
 A complicating factor exists, in my judgment, from within each view 
of the matter. For many liberal or secular folks, it is the fallout from 
the tragic complicity of traditional religion in the oppressiveness of 
social life throughout recorded history. Attempts to suppress an endless 
variety of “heresies” have co-existed with many other manifestations of 
serious constraints on liberty.101 Beyond that, religion allied with 
temporal power remains an ever-present serious threat to liberty in many 
arenas. Nonetheless, in democratic countries today there is a narrow 
(although by no means trivial) spectrum of questions of morality or 
ritual as to which there is serious mobilization seeking to continue or 
impose sanctions on those holding disfavored views. The ricocheting 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Theology: The Gospel As Narrated Promise, especially 72-82 (1985); 
Religion in American Life: A Dilemma for Democracy (1996). 
 
99The moral status of any resulting action is a separate question. 
Since action may impinge on the lives of others, more than what would 
suffice to justify belief is required to justify an action based on 
it. 
 
100Interestingly, the dismissive term, hocus pocus, may have 
originated with an English cleric as a parody of the holiest moment 
in the Roman Catholic Mass, when the celebrant lifts the Host and 
recites the (Latinized) words of Jesus, hoc est corpus meum (“this 
is my body”). 
   
101See, among many witnesses to this phenomenon from within the 
religious tradition, Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The 
Religious Uses of Modern Atheism (1992). I have summarized the effect 
on my own outlook in Listening for God, supra, at 14-16, 43-46.  
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escalation of rhetoric in the “culture wars” magnifies  (and may to some 
significant extent justify) the perception of what is at stake. 
 
 Within the traditionalist arena, much of the rancor and hyperbole 
that exists is attributable, I believe, to a fear that the outlook and 
values of those who challenge long-held premises and priorities will 
increasingly infect their own faith communities, especially their  
families - and most especially their children. Such a fear is hardly 
groundless (if at times exaggerated), and efforts to preserve 
traditional values within one’s subculture may seem futile without 
measures that impose on the liberty and equality interests of the 
supposed sources of those fears.102 Unhappily, the simple maxim, “Your 
right to swing your fist stops at my jaw” is no more adequate to separate 
the combatants in the clash of cultures than its cousin, “you started 
it,” is capable of assigning the roles of aggressor and besieged.103  
  
 The boundary between liberal religion and a modest secularity104 has 
a porous quality. Crossing the boundary in one direction or the other 
                                                 
102Recall the efforts of Catholics and Jews - initially Quakers as 
well, more recently Evangelical “home-schoolers” - to maintain 
separate schools for their communicants. With the rise of 
State-supported education, the question of eligibility for 
governmental support gradually transformed an effort that simply 
sought to insulate one’s children from mainstream influences into 
one of the more enduringly divisive public question, with each side 
claiming the status of being taken advantage of. 
  
103In his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, XXX 
(2003), Justice Scalia perceived one-half of the problem quite 
clearly, but (characteristically) the other not at all. He 
sympathetically described those committed to the preservation of 
legal constraints on gay equality as “protecting themselves and 
their families from a lifetyle that they believe to be immoral and 
destructive,“ id, at 586, but he contended that the fact of such a 
concern justified the imposition of sanctions (indeed, in the case 
at hand, criminal sanctions) on those whose personal lives may be 
thought to be contributing to accelerating changes in social norms. 
(Of course, he found warrant for this selectivity of concern in his 
understanding of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).   
 For my brief reflections on the difficulty of finding a neutral 
way of deciding “who started” the gay-equality disputes, see 
Religion in Legal Thought and Practice 349 (2010). 
    
104By this latter term, I mean to refer to those who simply find 
themselves unable to accept any non-naturalist understanding of the 
world, but do not actively regard religion as per se a malign force 
in the world. For recent examples of carefully articulated positions 
approaching near to the boundary, see Bruce Ledewitz, The New New 
Secularism and the End of the Law of the Separation of Church and 
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is less a matter of weighing the relative persuasiveness of two sides 
of a close quasi-empirical question than it is choosing between 
acceptance and wariness as a response to the sense of awe and wonder that 
often accompanies intimations of a vast unknown. If I may quote my own 
description of this difference: 
 
A religious consciousness deems it important to ground our 
stance toward the world in a palpable sense of wonder.  A 
secular morality tends to place more store by rationality as 
a guide to the truth, and tends to view a significant dose of 
"radical amazement" as getting in the way of clear thinking. 
The secularist abides not in wonder but in doubt .... Mystery 
tends to be regarded as a problem to be overcome if possible, 
and the conclusion that it is not possible as a confession of 
weakness or defeat.105 
 
 When neither reaction is held too tenaciously, those on either side 
of the frontier have no need, nor indeed any real capability, to defend 
their stance vigorously as against the other. Neil Gillman puts it 
wisely: “Religious commitments are probably the most existential issues 
we face. We have to be prepared to jump in and live with a tradition before 
we can appreciate its strength and weaknesses. The convinced skeptic may 
be unwilling to take this step.”106     
                                                                                                                                                                     
State, 28 Buff. Pub. Intl. L.J. 1, 19-26 (2009-2010); Scott Aikin 
& Robert B. Talisse, Reasonable Atheism: A Moral Case for Respectful 
Disbelief (2011). See also David Burrell’s development of the 
distinction between agnosticism “as we know it in modern times” and 
“unknowing.” “Convictions and Operative Warrant,” in Hauerwas, op. 
cit., n. XX supra, 43, 46-47. 
 
105The Religious Lawyer In a Pluralist Society, 66 Ford. L. Rev. 1469, 
1500 (1998). 
 
106Op. cit., supra, at 34. 
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 I do experience myself as being responsible for policing the 
boundaries of what I am willing to say I believe (even to myself). But 
this responsibility is less a matter of ethics than of intellectual 
integrity in holding or expressing beliefs or  participating in 
rituals of a faith community. They are “actions” only in a very limited 
sense. Wearing a prayer shawl in synagogue, taking Holy Communion with 
fellow congregants, fasting and eating at certain times and in certain 
ways rarely implicate questions of responsibility to others.107 
Intellectual integrity calls on one to be genuinely willing to reflect 
on finding oneself drawn to, resonating with, “spoken-to” by, 
religious narratives or practices.108 While genuine reflection 
connotes more than simply acknowledging and then clinging to one’s 
subjectivity, neither is it a matter of aggregating and weighing 
elements of a proof or of philosophical articulation of a general 
criterion of justification.109     
 
  
                                                 
107The moral responsibility not to impose on others requires more in 
the way of justification than a quasi-ethical, quasi-intellectual 
responsibility to have warrant for what one says or does. 
Evangelizing “all nations” (Matt. 28:19) or “rebuking” one’s 
neighbor for moral failings (Lev. 19:17) present major examples of 
the beginnings of something more. For a perceptive brief engagement 
with the contemporary intractability (yet diminshimg salience) of 
the question of Christians evangelizing Jews, see Edward A. Synan, 
The Popes and the Jews 160-61 (1965) (quoted in Religion and Legal 
Thought and Practice 570). For a recent example of that 
intractability, see id at XXX-XX.  
 I owe to Professor R. George Wright (in personal communication) 
the realization that “it may promote scandal in ways implicating 
one’s responsibility to fellow congregants” for a Roman Catholic to 
present oneself for Communion in circumstances when many others 
present would believe he or she was not eligible for it. Whether one 
has sufficient warrant to do so if acting out of a conscientious 
belief that Church teaching on the matters in question is seriously 
wrong, is not a matter about which I feel qualified to ruminate.     
 
108William James emphasizes the special salience of individual 
reflection, out of which the “total drift of thinking continues to 
confirm” a hypothesis. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy 12-17 (1956). Ronald Thiemann makes a similar 
point, in Revelation and Theology 111 n. 11 (1985): “Christians ought 
to seek what John Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’.” 
  
109For a complex, penetrating analysis by a New Zealander philosophy 
professor, see John Bishop, The Philosophy of Religion: A 
Programmatic Overview, 1/5 Phil. Compass 506 (2006). 
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 In the epigraphs to this article, an antebellum New England 
Unitarian minister avows that “God has made man with the instinctive 
love of justice in him, which gradually gets developed in the world,” 
while a 20th-Century mathematician, philosopher, political activist, 
and self-professed atheist asserts, “man created God, all-powerful and 
all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be.” A clear 
face-off between a “yes” and a “no”? Perhaps, but consider Bertrand 
Russell’s eloquent prefix to his deliberately provocative bon mot: 
 
A strange mystery it is that nature, omnipotent but blind, 
in the revolutions of her ... hurryings through the abysses 
of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still 
to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good 
and evil .... [G]radually, as morality grows bolder, the 
claim of the ideal world begins to be felt.... 
 
 It is a tribute to Russell’s integrity that, uttering words so 
resonant, so compatible, with Parker’s, he nonetheless would neither 
postulate nor acknowledge the reality of a transcendent Other. I find  
unity-within-divergence, as there also is divergence-within-unity, in 
the fervent words of these witnesses.  
 
 My own experience is resonant with this observation of Australian 
philosopher Professor Raimond Gaita:   
 
If we are not religious, we may say that all human beings 
are inestimably precious, that they are ends in themselves, 
that they are owed unconditional respect, that they possess 
inalienable rights, and, of course, that they possess 
inalienable dignity. In my judgment these are ways of trying 
to say what we feel a need to say when we are estranged from 
the conceptual resources we need to say it. Be that as it 
may: Not one of them has the simple power of the religious 
ways of speaking.110 
 
 Yet, the limits of our conceptual resources are themselves simply 
an aspect of our “creation,” and I cannot help but wonder whether the 
philosopher any less than the preacher would have appreciated the 
deeper implications of the Islamic sage’s offer of these words to the 
world a half-millennium earlier:  
 
 “Did I not engage thee to call upon me? 
    That calling ‘Allah’ of thine was my ‘Here am I.’ 
     And that pain and longing of thine my messenger.”111 
                                                 
110A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love and Truth and Justice 23 
(2000). 
 
111The poem is set out in full in the Addendum, immediately following. 
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   __________________________ 
 
Addendum 
 
 
THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAWLANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD RUMI112 
 
The man whose calling "O Allah" was equivalent 
     to God's answering him, "Here am I." 
 
                                                 
112The Travelers Who Ate the Young Elephant III: 1 (2008). 
 
That person one night was crying, "O Allah!"  
   That his mouth might be sweetened thereby,  
And Satan said to him, "Be quiet, O austere one!  
   How long wilt thou babble, O man of many words?  
   No answer comes to thee from nigh the throne,  
   How long wilt thou cry 'Allah' with harsh face?"  
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That person was sad at heart and hung his head,  
   And then beheld Khizr113 present before him in a vision,  
 Who said to him,  
   "Ah! thou hast ceased to call on God,  
     Wherefore repentest thou of calling upon Him?"  
The man said, "The answer 'Here am I' came not,  
   Wherefore I fear that I am repulsed from the door."  
 
Khizr replied to him, "God has given me this command;  
   Go to him and say, 'O much-tried one,  
   Did not I engage thee to do my service?  
   Did not I engage thee to call upon me?  
That calling 'Allah' of thine was my 'Here am I,'  
   And that pain and longing and ardour of thine my messenger;  
   Thy struggles and strivings for assistance  
   Were my attractions, and originated thy prayer.  
Thy fear and thy love are the covert [sic] of my mercy,  
   Each 'O Lord!' of thine contains many 'Here am I's’. 
 
                                                 
113a legendary Prophet, associated with the Biblical Elijah.         
